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LI platform.Introduction Therefore, governments, and in particular their law The advances of Information and Communication
Technologies (ICT) have facilitated worldwide cooperation,
communication and data sharing across the Internet. In
addition to its enormous beneﬁts, like any other broad-
spectrum technology, data communications can be also
employed for illegal purposes: human trafﬁcking, orga-
nized crime, illegal drug trade, child pornography,
terrorism, etc.oz), muruenya@it.
aricio), gsantos@it. enforcement and intelligence agencies, have to employ 
new tools to identify criminals and prosecute illegal acts 
when they occur, or are coordinated, through electronic 
means. Although Lawful Interception (LI) of data commu-
nications seems to be necessary nowadays, and thus it has 
been included in the legal framework of modern demo-
cratic countries, this does not mean that these monitoring 
technologies should be deployed without considering a 
number of human rights issues, including the secrecy of 
correspondence and privacy of private life. In fact, there are 
a multitude of recent examples where similar monitoring 
technologies have been employed for mass surveillance, 
thwarting freedom of speech and oppressing dissidents 
(Reporters without borders, March 2011; Clayton et al.,1
1 Notice though that, due to the different LI national legislations, it has
not even been adopted in all European countries.2006).?But?even?consolidated?democratic? societies?are?not?
immune? to? the?misuse?of? lawful? interception? technologies?
(Prevelakis?and?Spinellis,?2007;?Risen?and?Lichtblau;?Singel;?
Poulsen;?Difﬁe?and?Landau,?2009).
Democratic societies must thus ensure that lawful
interception of data communications is only employed in
very speciﬁc cases, when less intrusive methods cannot be
applied, and for the investigation of serious crimes that
thwart critical human rights, like the right to life or the
freedom from slavery that may override other human
rights such as privacy and secrecy of communications.
Nowadays this is achieved by a combination of legal and
procedural mechanisms that depend on national legisla-
tions and thus vary very signiﬁcantly among countries.
Nevertheless, in many countries lawful interception must
be explicitly authorized by a judge, who veriﬁes that any
wiretap request from a Law Enforcement Agency (LEA), such
as the Police, is well founded, has justiﬁable grounds and/or
a probable cause, and that the criminal offense being
investigated is severe enough to justify the monitoring of
all (or part) of the suspect's communications, and only
during a certain period of time. The judge then issues a so-
called Wiretap Warrant (WW), specifying the details and
restrictions of the authorized monitoring. The LEA hands
over the WW document to the telecommunication pro-
vider of the suspect, which should ﬁrst verify it and then
start monitoring the communications of its customer. This
monitoring may be performed ad hoc, but it is usually done
by means of dedicated LI equipment, which telecom pro-
viders are bound by law to deploy in order to operate in the
country. The captured communications should be delivered
only to the law enforcement agency that originally
requested it. Finally, the LEA employs the captured com-
munications for its investigations and, depending on the
national legislation, the intercepted contents may be
employed as evidence in a court of justice.
Therefore, the security of the whole process mainly re-
sides on the paper-based wiretap warrant and thus on the
trust that the telecom provider really validates the WWand
abides to its rules and limits, such as keeping the captured
information conﬁdential. However, this wiretap warrant is
merely an administrative document, meaning that the tele-
com provider, in collusion with the LEA or other third party,
may monitor some of its customers without a valid WW,
ignore the limits of an existing one, or just peek into the
captured data of a valid LI, for instance to sell it to journalists.
Furthermore, a corrupt member of the LEA may silently
delete or tamper some digital evidence (e.g. changing the
date or the locationof a phone call) in order to incriminate an
innocent person or to release a criminal. Obviously these are
serious offences that are severely penalized in all legal
frameworks, but still nowadays the proper implementation
of lawful interception is only enforced by legal and admin-
istrative means, not technical ones.
In order to solve these problems, this paper proposes the
so-called Digital Wiretap Warrant (DWW), which is also is-
sued by a judge to authorize, within certain limits, the
monitoring of a particular suspect.However theDWWis also
a digital document, and thus it can be an integral part of the
lawful interception technical process. In particular, we pro-
pose that certiﬁed LI equipment cannot be enabledwithout avalid DWW (i.e. digitally signed by a judge), and that the
captured communications must be securely time-stamped,
signed and encrypted by the monitoring station itself, so
that not even the telecom provider can peek at the data
captured by the LI platform, but only the law enforcement
agency that obtained the DWW from the judge. Moreover, a
corrupt or overzealous LEA agent cannot secretly delete or
tamper the seized digital evidence, since the new DWW-
enabled LI process creates a secure chain of custody that
can be followed back up to the monitoring station that
captured the data. Furthermore, this paper speciﬁes how the
proposed DWW mechanism can be applied to the LI archi-
tecture deﬁned by the LI Technical Committee of the Euro-
pean Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).
Before? starting? to?discuss? the?details?of? the?DWW?pro-
posal,?Section?2? reviews? related?work?on? lawful? intercep-
tion.? Section? 3? brieﬂy? summarizes? ETSI? LI? standards? and?
analyses? their? security? limitations.? Section? 4? provides? an?
overview?of?the?proposed?DWW-enabled?LI?process? in?the?
context? of? the? considered? ETSI? LI? limitations.? Section? 5?
explains? in? detail? the? proposed? DWW? LI? platform.? Then,?
Section?6?analyses? the?security?properties?of? the?proposed?
DWW? LI?workﬂow,? while? Section? 7? provides? a? brief? dis-
cussion?about? the?performance,?cost?and? scalability?of? the?
DWW?LI?platform.?Finally,?Section?8?summarizes?the?main?
results?of?this?work?and?concludes?the?paper.
Related work
Most? fears?about?powerful?surveillance?programs?were?
summed? up? by? Difﬁe? and? Landau? in? (Difﬁe? and? Landau,?
2009,?2007).?From?a?more?technical?point?of?view,?there? is?
still? a? vivid? debate? (Electronic? Frontier? Foundation? and?
2014e04;? Townsend)? on? whether? building? wiretapping?
capabilities? into? communications? infrastructures? is? truly?
necessary? or? it? creates? new? privacy? risks? (Riabov,? May?
2000).?However,? this? has? not? stopped? other? LI? standardi-
zation?efforts?or?network?vendors? from? including?LI?capa-
bilities? on? their? products? (Baker? et? al.,? 2004),? and? LI?
technologies?are?widely?used?nowadays? in?modern?demo-
cratic? countries.? The? two? major? LI? standards? are? CALEA?
(Communications? Assistance? for? Law? Enforcement? Act),?
mainly? employed? in? the? USA,? and? ETSI? LI,? which? is?
a? European? standard,1? although? it? is? also? employed? in?
several?parts?of? the?world,?as? it?has?also?been?adopted?by?
other? bodies? like? the? 3rd? Generation? Partnership? Project?
(3GPP).?This?paper? is? focused? on? the?ESTI? LI? architecture,?
which?is?explained?in?next?section.
In? the? last? years? several? security? researchers? have? re-
ported?potential?attacks?to?LI?systems?(Cross,?2010),?as?well?
as? some? abuses? by? law? enforcement? or? intelligence?
agencies.? For? instance? the? intercept? target? can? launch?
denial? of? service? (DoS)? attacks? (Sherr? et? al.,? 2009)? that?
prevent?the?accurate?collection?of?not?only?the?call?contents,?
but? even? the?metadata? recorded?by? the? law? enforcement?
agency.? These? problems? motivate? other? researchers? to?
propose? improvements? to? lawful? interception? systems,?or2
even completely different alternatives (Bellovin et al., 
2013) for LI. In (Bates et al., 2012), Bates et al. proposed a 
more accountable CALEA wiretapping system that enables 
secure audits. The proposed system maintains an 
encrypted log of wiretap meta-data, and allows different 
access proﬁles to those wiretap records.
Regarding to actual cases of LI misuse, probably the 
most well-known one is the Vodafone Greece case 
(Prevelakis and Spinellis, 2007) i n 2 0 0 4e2005, where 
some unknown attackers leveraged the wiretap capabilities 
of mobile network switches to spy the communications of 
more than 100 mobile phones of high level ofﬁcials, 
including the Greek Prime Minister and members of his 
government. Meanwhile in the United States, it was re-
ported that the national security agency (NSA) illegally 
wiretapped US residents without a proper wiretap warrant 
(Risen and Lichtblau; Singel). And more recently, it has 
been reported that some analysts abused the vast NSA 
powers tools to spy their love interests or just other people 
they met (Poulsen).Fig. 1. Workﬂow in ETSI Lawful Interception framework (ETSI, April 2002).ETSI Lawful Interception standards
The speciﬁcations produced by the ETSI Technical
Committee Lawful Interception deﬁne a reference hand-
over interface for the provision of Lawful Interception (LI)
from a Network Operator (NWO), Service Provider (SvP) or
Access Provider (AP) to a Law Enforcement Agency (LEA).
The following speciﬁcations are basic to understand the
LI framework deﬁned by ETSI:
 ETSI Technical Speciﬁcation 101 331 (ETSI, 2009) pro-
vides the set of requirements for lawful interception 
from the LEA point of view.
 ETSI Standard 201 158 (ETSI, April 2002) describes the
common network functions and the general 
architec-ture to be applied to all network technologies.
 ETSI Technical Speciﬁcation 101 671 (ETSI, 2011) spec-
iﬁes the generic ﬂow of information, procedures and
information elements.
 ETSI Technical Speciﬁcation 102 232 has seven parts that
deﬁne, among others, the IP-based LI handover interface 
(ETSI, 2011) and how IP messaging (ETSI, 2012a) and 
Internet access services (ETSI, 2012b) should be 
intercepted.
The ETSI, together with the Third Generation Partner-
ship Project (3GPP), also specify how to intercept voice and
other multimedia services carried out by circuit-switched
PSTN/ISDN networks, cellular services, or IP Multimedia
Services (IMS). This paper is focused on data communica-
tions over IP networks, although our proposal could be also
extended to those multimedia services as well.
The information to be provided to the LEA is divided into
two types: Intercept Related Information (IRI) and Content of
Communication (CC). The former is basically meta-
information associated with the communication, such as
the time or the user's location. The latter is the actual data
exchanged between two or more users (i.e. ﬂow of TCP/IP
datagrams or an e-mail message).Fig. 1 shows the main steps of the ﬂow of information 
among the different players in the ETSI LI framework:
1. A LEA (e.g. the Police) makes a lawful interception
request for a particular subject to the authorization
authority.
2. The authorization authority (e.g. a judge) issues a lawful
authorization (i.e. wiretap warrant) for the LEA.
3. The LEA hands over this authorization to the NWO/AP/
SvP, who determines the relevant target identities from
the information contained in the authorization.
4. The NWO/AP/SvP conﬁgures its interception facilities to
monitor the relevant target identities (e.g. a cellular line
and the Internet connection at home).
5. The NWO/AP/SvP informs the LEA that the lawful
authorization has been received and acted upon. Infor-
mation relating to the target identities and the target
identiﬁcation may be also passed.
6. The CC sent by the target identity is intercepted by the
NWO/AP/SvP.
7. The CC and associated IRI are handed over from the
NWO/AP/SvP to the LEA monitoring facility.
8. Either on request from the LEA or when the period of the
lawful authorization expires, the NWO/AP/SvP ceases
the interception.
9. The NWO/AP/SvP announces this cessation to the LEA.
The communications between the LEA Monitoring Fa-
cility (LEMF) and the NWO/AP/SvP domain occurs through 
the Handover Interface (HI), which is a generic reference 
interface that is logically split in three sub-interfaces to 
exchange administrative (HI1), IRI (HI2) and CC (HI3) in-
formation as shown in Fig. 2.
HI1 exchanges administrative information between the
LEA and the NWO/AP/SvP such as the requests to establish
or remove an interception from the LEA to the NWO/AP/
SvP, the acknowledgement messages back to the LEA, and3
Fig.?2.? Reference?model?of?ETSI? lawful? interception? framework? for?packet?services? (ETSI,?2011).status reports such as alarms or other information related
to the interception functions.
HI2 transports the Intercept Related Information (IRI)
from the NWO/AP/SvP to the LEMF. That is, the signalling
information used to establish the communication service
and to control it, and any other supplementary service or
location information, for instance the IP address of the
target.
HI3?transports?the?Content?of?Communication?(CC)?from?
the?NWO/AP/SvP?to?the?LEMF.?It?must?be?a?cleartext?copy?of?
the? information? ﬂow.? If? the? NWO/AP/SvP? provides?
encryption? for? its? customers? (i.e.? webmail? over? HTTPS),?
then?the?result?of? interception?needs?to?be?handed?over?to?
the?LEA?already?decrypted?by?the?NWO/AP/SvP.?Fig.?2?shows?
in?more?detail? the? internals? of? the?NWO/AP/SvP?domain.?
The? Internal? Interception? Function? (IIF)? is? a? set? of? logical?
entities? that? comprises? the? functions? internal? to? the?
network?that?perform?the?actual?interception:?IRI-IIF,?CC-IIF?
and? CC? Trigger? Function? (CCTF).? The? Internal? Network? In-
terfaces? (INI)? is? a? set? of? interfaces? that? carry? information?
among?the?Administration?Function?(AF),?the?IIFs,?and?what?
is?called?a?Mediation?Function?(MF),?which?acts?as?a?proxy?
and?passes?information?through?the?Handover?Interfaces?to?
the?LEMF.
The Administration Function (AF) ensures that an
intercept request from a LEA via HI1 is provisioned for
delivery from the network to the LEA. It provides IRI-IIF,
CCTF and MF with the required information to perform
their tasks.
The IRI-IIF generates IRI information associated with
sessions, calls, connections and any other meta-information
involving intercepted targets. It notiﬁes target activity to
the CCTF via the CC Trigger Interface (CCTI) to enable dynamic
provisioning (e.g. in the case of an Access Provider operating
multiple WiFi hotspots across the country), in addition to
static provisioning (e.g. if the target employs a ﬁxed xDSL
access). CCTF determines the location of the CC-IIF deviceassociated to the target CC trafﬁc, and controls it via the CC
Control Interface (CCCI). This CC-IIF device, that we call
Monitoring Station (MS) in the sequel, captures the CC from
the network.
TheMediation Function (MF)must be ﬁrst provisioned by
the AF. It then receives information related to active in-
tercepts from the IRI-IIFs and CC-IIFs, and correlates and
formats such information for delivery to the LEMF over the
HI2 (IRI) and HI3 (CC) handover interfaces. If more than one
LEA has requested the interception of the same target, the
captured information is duplicated and sent to those LEAs. In
order for the MF to distinguish among the information that
corresponds to each LEA, and to keep the knowledge about
the targets limited within the authorized NWO/AP/SvP op-
erators and the LEAs handling agents, an opaque Lawful
Interception Identiﬁer (LIID) shall be agreed between each
LEAand theoperator. This is amaincomponentof theCCand
IRI, and is used for identiﬁcation and correlation purposes.
In? addition? to? the? featured? interfaces,? ETSI? Technical?
Report?103?690?(ETSI,?February?2012c),?has?recently?speci-
ﬁed? an? electronic? interface,? called? eWarrant? interface,? for?
the? reception?of? requests? for? real-time?or? stored? informa-
tion? (i.e.? subject? to?data? retention?policies)? by?an? issuing?
authority?possessing?lawful?authorization?to?initiate?such?a?
request.?Although? this?digital? interface?may?be? similar? to?
the? proposed? DWW? concept,? it? does? only? consider? the?
administrative?part?of?the?LI,?and?thus?does?not?protect?the?
LI?data?path?as?DWW?does.?Nevertheless,?it?is?interesting?to?
note? the? increasing? importance? of? security? and? privacy?
within?the?ETSI?LI?Technical?Committee.
Current limitations of ETSI Lawful Interception
ETSI?LI?standards?only? include?a? small?number?of?con-
siderations? regarding? the? security? of? the? LI? framework?
(ETSI,? 2006),? other? than? common? ICT? security? best? prac-
tices.? In?particular,? it?addresses?security?by?protecting? the4
communication between consecutive LI elements (i.e. in a
hop-by-hop basis). It recommends using X.509 certiﬁcates
to authenticate the endpoints, and Transport Layer Security
(TLS) or IPSec-based Virtual Private Network (VPN) tech-
nologies to protect the exchanged information among all
framework entities, and especially across the handover
interface (HI). Therefore, intermediate systems, like the
NWO Mediation Function (MF), could access all captured
information, since it is only encrypted in transit from the
Monitoring Station (MS) to the MF and from the MF to the
Law Enforcement Mediation Function (LEMF). In our
opinion, this reduced security framework leads to the
following limitations of ETSI LI standards from the point of
view of guaranteeing civil liberties:
Wiretap warrant authorization is just an adminis-
trative process. This means that NWO/AP/SvP staff may
misuse the deployed LI framework to illegally monitor its
customers, gather information about current LEAs in-
vestigations, etc.
Privacy only among contiguous entities (e.g. from MS
to MF and fromMF to LEMF). Intermediate entities, like the
NWO MF, have access to all captured information in
cleartext.
ETSI LI standards do not include any reference to
guaranteeing a proper evidence chain of custody, in
order to allow captured data being safely employed as ev-
idence in a court of justice.
Digital Wiretap Warrant (DWW) proposal
To address the aforementioned issues, we propose
enhancing the ETSI LI standards with the so-called Digital
Wiretap Warrant (DWW) in order to better guarantee civil
rights by technical means. The DWW proposal has been
designed as a complement to current ETSI LI standards and
systems, instead of calling for a complete overhaul of those.
The main principles of the DWW proposal are:
Lawful Interception equipment must be only enabled
by a valid DWW. Any lawful interception system that may
monitor the communications of citizens must be limited in
time, minimize the data to be captured, and be explicitly
approved by the appropriate authority. In particular, no
element of the LI framework must be able to work without
a valid DWW.2
Privacy and protection of captured content. All con-
tent captured during the investigations must be strictly
private, and thus it should only be disclosed to the autho-
rized personnel of the LEA, under the need-to-know prin-
ciple. Therefore, all communication contents must be
encrypted from the moment they are captured, and only
the LEA that requested the wiretap (i.e. not even the NWO/
AP/SvP, or any third party thatmay store them) should have
access to the decryption key. At any moment, the lawful
interception platform must know where communications2 Notice that this would prevent “emergency” wiretaps that allow LEAs
to start monitoring a suspect before asking for court approval. However
this practice may be still supported by allowing the Judicial System to
automatically sign short-term “emergency” DWWs to LEAs, which are
later replaced by a properly judge-supervised one without disrupting the
ongoing interception.are stored, the actual number of copies, and who/when
accessed them.
Secure chain of custody. Any exchanged information
between LI systems and access to the seized content must
be authorized by cryptographic means, guaranteeing the
integrity of data and the identity of both peers. Although
these considerations are mostly applicable to the internal
LEA systems, the LI framework must also ensure that every
transaction is digitally signed by the source entity, and
securely time-stamped. This is the pre-requisite for any
future auditing process that may be performed by an in-
dependent expert in order to guarantee the validity of
digital evidence.
No evidence tampering/fabrication, even in confabu-
lation scenarios. Besides a secure chain of custody, the LI
platform should hinder any attempt of evidence fabrica-
tion/tampering, even if several entities (e.g. LEA and NWO)
confabulate. This requires technical mechanisms, but also
administrative ones. For instance, the LI platform should
provide automatic mechanisms to securely capture, trans-
fer and store the seized information, but other key tasks,
such as the approval of the wiretap by the judge or the
NWO, require human supervision to evaluate non-technical
issues, such as the proportionality of the wiretap with
respect to the investigated crime and the probable cause.
On the other hand, the digital nature of DWW can simplify
the administrative process by performing automatic
checks, and thus avoiding common human mistakes.
Therefore, we do not propose replacing the current LI
procedures or human supervision, but to improve them
with additional tools.
Support for off-line transport and storage of infor-
mation. Unlike current ETSI LI standards, this proposal is
not only focused on securing data transmission, but data
itself. This means that information is protected even when
not in transit, for instance when stored in the MF proxy.
This also enables any kind of transport mechanism,
including off-line ones (e.g. sending a hard disk with the
captured data to the LEA), which may be necessary in some
cases due to the huge volume of information that a com-
plete data wiretap could entail.DWW architecture: main concepts
The DWW architecture consists of four main players:
the Law Enforcement Agency (LEA), the Network Operator
(NWO),3 the Judicial System (JS) and a global Time
Stamping Authority (TSAglobal) that may be also hosted by
the Judicial System or another party. Our proposal has been
designed to avoid major changes to the standard ETSI LI
architecture. In particular, ETSI LI systems keep most of
their behaviour and communication technologies. Our
proposal is focused on the application-level messages
exchanged through standardized interfaces (both for
administrative and mediation functions), in order to fulﬁl
the target security requirements. All exchanged3 For simplicity, in this paper we only refer to Network Operators
(NWOs), but all discussions are also applicable to Access Providers (APs)
and Service Providers (SvPs).
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information among platform elements are encrypted and
signed, and the most important data are also time-stamped
to protect the evidence custody chain and enable auditing.
The typical operation of the DWWarchitecture requires
the exchange of different information by the administrative
interfaces of the LEA, the NWO and the JS involved in
interception LI. If all administrative, security and legal
checks are right, the NWO starts the requested interception
and all seized data is handed over to the appropriate LEAs.
As explained later, a DWW is divided into two different
parts: DWWNWO and DWWLEA. The judge ﬁrst gives to the
requesting LEA theDWWNWO part, so the LEA could request
a speciﬁc NWO to start the interception, once the order has
been validated (both, technically and administratively).
The DWWLEA part is only be provided to the LEA when the
judge considers that it may start analysing the seized data.
These two DWW orders make use of symmetric and
asymmetric cryptography for achieving these aims.
In addition to the described domains, the Monitoring
Station (MS) is the core element of our platform. It resides in
the NWO but it is not fully under NWO administration. To
accomplish the objectives of our proposal, the monitoring
station implements additional securitymechanisms thatwill
be described in the following sections. It is worth noting that
a MS only works with a validDWWNWO signed by a judge. All
information captured by the MS is encrypted, signed and
time-stamped. Therefore, any intermediate element cannot
access this information, but only a speciﬁc LEA can decrypt it
when the judge provides the DWWLEA part.Technical description of the DWW framework
In order to guarantee conﬁdentiality, integrity, authen-
tication and non-repudiation at the administrative function
level, each administrative entity must have at least one pair
of asymmetric keys (provided as digital certiﬁcates):
Judicial System Administration: < JSpub; JSpriv >
Law Enforcement Agency Administration:
< LEApub; LEApriv >
Network Operator Administration:
<NWOpub;NWOpriv >
A Judge (J) can only communicate with other domains
through the judicial system administration. An interception
is only possible with a digital wiretap warrant, signed by
the judge authorized to do so. Every judge that is able to
authorize a LI must have a key pair (as a digital certiﬁcate)
in order to digitally sign the DWWs:
Judge: < Jpub; Jpriv >
A trusted, global Time Stamping Authority (TSAglobal)
must also exist. The TSA securely time-stamps the trans-
actions between systems in different administrative do-
mains. The TSA may be hosted by the Judicial System to
improve its auditing and oversight capabilities, although
being an independent entity could provide additionalsecurity against confabulation. This element is essential to
guarantee the evidence chain of custody, since it allows
knowing when communications took place and prevents
the erasure of information as it will be described later. In
order to hinder Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, the access to
TSA should be limited, so only the systems deﬁned by the
LEAs and NWOs should be able to access it. TSA authenti-
cation and integrity are also achieved using a key pair:
TSAglobal : < TSAglobalpub; TSAglobalpriv >
Each domainmay have its own Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) in order to issue certiﬁcates and validate the ones
from the local domain, as well as to validate the public
certiﬁcates from other domains by means of peer agree-
ments (i.e. cross-signing the certiﬁcates of peer entities).
The administrative communication among different do-
mains is always similar:
1. The emitter domain signs the message to be sent with its
private key (providing authentication and integrity) and
encrypts it with the public key of receiver (providing
privacy).
2. Then the receiver domain communicates with the TSA-
global to obtain a timestamp that demonstrates the
reception of the message sent by the emitter domain.
3. Finally the receiver domain sends an acknowledgment of
this message, including its timestamp (TSAglobal), to the
emitter domain. With this information both domains
have non-repudiation proofs of their interaction thanks
to the trustworthy TSAglobal.Handover of DWW from LEA to NWO
When some investigation department of a LEA wants to
intercept the communications of a particular suspect, it has
to ﬁrst request it to the internal LEA LI department for
approval, which should be the only one able to communi-
cate with the judicial system. Our proposal, like ETSI LI
speciﬁcations, does not mandate how the internal LEA
structure should be, but only that there should be a single
communication point with the judicial system and NWOs.
However, it is recommended that internal LEA communi-
cations are also secure, in order to guarantee the conﬁ-
dentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation,
and to prevent unauthorized information leaks, such as
knowing whether a LEA is investigating a particular person.
The wiretap request (DWWrqst) from the LI administra-
tive department of the law enforcement agency (LEA) is
sent to the judicial system (JS). This request contains at
least the following information: the target network oper-
ator (NWOid), all available information to identity the sus-
pect (Uname), the data to be captured (CCtype) -e.g. the
complete packet, including its application payload, or just
its TCP/IP headers-, the requested wiretap duration (Wtime),
the address of the LEA monitoring facility where the
captured data will be sent (LEMFaddr), including its public
key to authenticate it, and the investigated case identiﬁer
(ICid). The ICid is employed as the LI Identiﬁer (LIID) by all
lawful interception systems to identify the captured data.6
4 encK(M) means encrypting message M with key K; hash(M) means
applying a cryptographic hash function over message M;
signK(M) ¼ encK(hash(M)) means digitally signing message M with key K;
and tstampK(D,S) ¼ signK(DjS) means time-stamping signature Swith date
D by digitally signing the concatenation of date D and the signature S.Thus it has to be globally unique, but it should not contain
any meaningful structure, such as LEA or department
identiﬁers, to avoid leaking information about the internal
structure of the LEA to third parties. Finally, the DWW
request should also include a detailed explanation by the
LEA agents about why the DWW is requested, the kind of
crime being investigated, the role of the suspect, any evi-
dence against him, etc., so the judge can decide whether
the DWWrequest has legal grounds, or it has to be rejected.
The LI administrative department of the judicial system
performstheappropriate technical andadministrativechecks,
and sends the DWWrqst to the assigned judge. As in the LEA
case, this proposaldoesnotmandate any internal structure for
the judicial system, although communications should be
encrypted and digitally signed when possible. In this case,
both the administrativedepartment (JS) and the judge (J) have
a public-private key pair to sign the DWWs, therefore it can
also be leveraged to protect internal communications.
After evaluating the legal aspects of the wiretap request
and approving it, the judge creates a digital wiretap warrant,
DWW ¼ {DWWNWO, DWWLEA}, and digitally signs each part
with her private key. Previously, a pair of asymmetric keys is
also generated by the judge per Investigation Case <ICpub,
ICpriv>. The purpose of these keys is to protect all information
captured by the NWO with a symmetric key that is then
encrypted with the public key of the case (ICpub). Thus, such
information can only be accessed by possessing the private
key (ICpriv). Therefore the DWWNWO part includes the public
key of the case (ICpub) in order to encrypt data, while the
DWWLEA part contains the private key (ICpriv) to decrypt such
data.Moreover, thismechanism links the issuedDWWto the
whole interception process, as described later. By generating
one key per case, instead of relying on some global LEA key,
only the agents assigned to a casewill be able to access to the
seized information, and only when the judge provides them
with the private key of the case (DWWLEA/ICpriv).
The?DWWNWO? is?the?only?part?of?the?digital?wiretap?war-
rant? that? the? LEA?will?hand?over? to? the? suspect's?network?
operator? (NWO).? It? should? contain? at? least? all? wiretap?
warrant? details? (WW)? as? in? the? ETSI? eWarrant? (ETSI,?
February?2012c),?content?(CCtype)?and?temporal?limits?(Wstart?
and?Wend?times)?of?the?wiretap,?the?case?ID?provided?by?the?
LEA? (ICid),? LEA? address? and? public? key? (LEMFaddr),? a?
certiﬁcate?with?the? ICpub?key?signed?by?the? judge,?plus?the?
certiﬁcate?of? the? judge? (Jcert? containing? Jpub)? issued?by? the?
judicial?system?PKI.
The DWWLEA contains the case ID (ICid) and the private
key of the investigated case (ICpriv) as a certiﬁcate signed by
the judge. The key is provided to the LEA when the judge
dictates, in order to permit the LEA to access the seized data.
This DWW proposal adheres to current ETSI speciﬁca-
tions where the network operator (NWO) administrator
knows the suspect being monitored, which LEA has
requested the wiretap, as well as the particular judge that
approved it. Besides, the LEA knows who the NWO of the
suspect is. The DWW proposal could be adapted to a more
anonymous scenario by modifying the request information
and the certiﬁcates employed to sign them. For instance,
when a LEA requests a DWW to the judicial system, the
judge may ask the NWO to send the seized information to
their own proxy systems, before reaching the LEMF
(instead of directly to the LEA). This way the NWO cannotknow which LEA is investigating its customer. Moreover,
the judge may employ anonymous certiﬁcates, still issued
by the judicial system PKI, so the NWO may know that a
DWW is valid, but not who is the speciﬁc judge that
approved it. However this is not just a technical decision,
but the need of identifying all peers involved in a LI may be
a requisite of the national legislation.
For simplicity, this description refers to a single user and
a single network operator. However, in case there are
several targets, or the suspect employs several NWOs, it is
only necessary to generate a different DWW and LIID per
user/NWO pair. This prevents different NWOs to be aware
of each other, or knowing whether monitored users are
associated or belong to different cases. Therefore, a multi-
user/multi-provider LI scenario can be reduced to several
single-user/single-provider scenarios running in parallel,
which can later be integrated and correlated by the LEA.
At this point the LEA has a valid DWW (DWWNWO),
approved by an authorised judge, and it is now able to hand
it over to the NWO in order to request the monitoring of all
(or part) of the suspects communications.
The next paragraphs show the described message ex-
change and the main cryptographic operations4:
The LEA requests a DWW to Judicial System (JS) and
Judge (J):
DWWrqst ¼

NWOid;Uname;CCtype;Wtime; LEMFaddr; ICid

SignLEADWWrqst ¼ signLEApriv

DWWrqst

SendLEAJSDWWrqst ¼ encJSpub

DWWrqst ; SignLEADWWrqst

The Judicial System (JS) requests a timestamp (Dateglobal)
to TSAglobal as a receipt of the received information, and
sends an acknowledgment back to the LEA:
TSAglobalSignLEADWWrqst ¼
tstampTSAglobalpriv

Dateglobal; SignLEADWWrqst

SignJSTSAglobalDWWrqst ¼
signJSpriv

Dateglobal; TSAglobalSignLEADWWrqst

ACKJSLEADWWrqst ¼ encLEApub

Dateglobal;
TSAglobalSignLEADWWrqst ; SignJSTSAglobalDWWrqst

If the Judge (J) authorizes the LEA request, an Investi-
gated Case (IC) key pair is generated <ICpub, ICpriv> and both
parts of the DWW are signed to enable such LI:
DWWNWO ¼
WW ;CCtype;Wstart ;Wend; LEMFaddr; ICid; ICpub; Jcert

DWWLEA ¼

ICid; ICpriv; Jcert

SignJDWWNWO ¼ signJprivðDWWNWOÞ
SignJDWWLEA ¼ signJpriv ðDWWLEAÞ7
The LEA receives the DWWNWO signed by the Judge (J)
from the Judicial System (JS):
SignJSJDWWNWO ¼ signJSpriv

SignJDWWNWO

SendJSLEADWWNWO ¼ encLEApub
DWWNWO; SignJDWWNWO; SignJSJDWWNWO

The LEA requests another timestamp ðDate0TSAglobal Þ as a
receipt of the DWWs reception. It sends an acknowledg-
ment to Judicial System (JS):
TSAglobalSignJSJDWWNWO¼ tstampTSAglobalpriv


Date0global;SignJSJDWWNWO

SignLEATSAglobalDWWNWO¼signLEApriv

n
Date0global;TSAglobalSignJSJDWWNWO
o
ACKLEAJSDWWNWO¼encJSpub
n
Date0global;
TSAglobalSignJSJDWWNWO;SignLEATSAglobalDWWNWO
o
The LEA sends the DWWNWO to the suspect's Network
Operator (NWO). It receives as acknowledgement a third
timestamp from the NWO, which was previously requested
to TSAglobal:
SignLEAJDWWNWO¼signLEApriv

SignJDWWNWO

SendLEANWODWWNWO¼encNWOpub

DWWNWO;
SignJDWWNWO;SignLEAJDWWNWO

TSAglobalSignLEAJDWWNWO¼tstampTSAglobalpriv


Date
00
global;SignLEAJDWWNWO

SignNWOTSAglobalDWWNWO¼signNWOpriv

n
Date
00
global;TSAglobalSignLEAJDWWNWO
o
ACKNWOLEADWWNWO¼encLEApub

n
Date
00
global;TSAglobalSignLEAJ ;SignNWOTSAglobalDWWNWO
o
The administrative department of the NWO that han-
dles LI requests validates the DWWNWO sent by LEA, both at
technical (e.g. checking the cryptographic signatures) and
regulatory levels (e.g. checking the jurisdiction of the judge
and the LEA), and asks for further details if necessary, as it is
done today with paper wiretap warrants, although certain
automatic checks are now possible.Communications interception by NWO. Hand over to LEA
Before explaining the technical details of how commu-
nication interception is performed and secured, it is
necessary to discuss some aspects of the network operator
(NWO) role, and the importance of the Monitoring Station
(MS).
Monitoring Station (MS)
Most interception functions, including the CC Trigger
Function (CCTF) and the IRI Internal Interception Function
(IRI-IIF), heavily depend on the inner workings of the NWO
(i.e. internal topology and user session management,respectively), and thus are difﬁcult to standardize. Instead,
this paper is focused on the CC Internal Interception
Function (CC-IIF), which performs the data capturing pro-
cess itself (i.e. snifﬁng IP packets), and thus it is much easier
to employ standard devices. ETSI LI does not specify
whether the CC-IIF should be implemented in a NWO
network node or as a separate, dedicated device that re-
ceives a copy of the trafﬁc to be captured. The former re-
duces the LI deployment cost, whereas the latter simpliﬁes
management and network upgrades. For simplicity, we call
Monitoring Station (MS) to the ETSI CC-IIF element, inde-
pendently of how it is implemented (either as a separate
element or integrated in a NWO router). The monitoring
station is a key element of the DWW proposal, since it
enables the following features:
Enforcement of DWW. The monitoring station must
only be able to capture the communications of a suspect if it
has been enabled by a valid digital wiretap warrant, which
speciﬁes the type of contents to be captured and its tem-
poral limits.
End-to-end privacy. All captured information is
encrypted before leaving the monitoring station using the
public key of the case (ICpub). The only way to access such
information is by means of the private key of the case
(ICpriv) generated by the judge. Therefore, not even the
NWO is able to peek into the captured data.
Secure chain of custody. Monitoring stations timestamp
and sign capture ﬁles in order to trace back all digital evi-
dence, as well as to link it with a particular DWW. This may
be essential during a trial to ensure that evidence has not
been tampered and that it was captured at the claimed time.
Misuse of LI framework. In most countries, NWO must
deploy LI infrastructure by law, and in some cases the
government may fund part of the investment. Therefore,
this infrastructure must be employed for legal interception
purposes only, avoiding any kind of misuse, either from
unauthorized users or by the NWO itself (i.e. to monitor the
trafﬁc exchanged by its customers), even if monitoring
stations are managed by NWO staff.
Therefore, in order to improve the lawful interception 
security, the DWW proposal only requires adding certain 
features to this monitoring device, because it is the key 
element of the DWW data path. However, as far as it is 
certiﬁed for LI, the monitoring stations can be manufactured 
by any vendor, and thus the NWO can freely choose the MS 
best suited for its network. The most important features of a 
DWW-certiﬁed monitoring station are the cryptographic 
functions (digital signing, secure random number genera-
tion, and symmetric key generation), performed by a Hard-
ware Security Module (HSM) such as (Thales nShield Solo 
hardware security module, 2015). The HSM is the only MS 
subsystem not managed by the NWO but by the judicial 
system. Therefore, in order to be trusted, it has to be tamper-
proof (i.e. physical access to the HSM should be controlled 
with seals). The HSM may be owned by the judicial system 
itself for greater security, or any certiﬁed HSM may be 
installed by the NWO for greater ﬂexibility.
Each monitoring station has an asymmetric key pair
<MSpub, MSpriv>, generated by the HSM itself, as well as a
unique serial number (MSid). Before deploying it, a technician
from the judicial systemorother auditing agencycertiﬁes the8
monitoring station by signing the MSpub key (MSpriv must
never leave the HSM). The signed MSpub key is given to the
NWO as a certiﬁcate issued by the judicial system, so the LI
department of the NWO is able to verify the validity of the
certiﬁcate (e.g. if it has been revoked or it has expired), and
the public key can be employed to send private information
to a given monitoring station. The JS technician also installs
the public root certiﬁcate of the judicial systems PKI, in order
to allow the HSM to validate the DWWs from authorized
judges, aswell as his/her ownpublic key (JStech) signed by the
judicial system. After the initial deployment, as any other
certiﬁed equipment like gas pumps, monitoring stations
should be subject to periodic reviews by auditors from the
judicial system who check that the seals of the monitoring
station have not beenbroken and that theHSMonly contains
the original keys and trusted certiﬁcates, as well as updating
the MS revocation list with invalid certiﬁcates (if any).
Once this certiﬁcation procedure is in place, the NWO is
able to verify whether the monitoring station is working
properly (i.e. the certiﬁcate has not been revoked or
expired), but it cannot tamper the captured data because
the HSM private key of the monitoring station (MSpriv) is
unknown even to the JS, and it is not able to re-generate a
new key (MSpub) because it would not be signed by the
judicial system. In any case, both the physical and logical
access to monitoring stations should be restricted to a
minimum set of trusted people, ideally from the LI
department of the NWO and the JS.
Obviously, the NWO could still somehow tamper the
data before being captured by the monitoring station, such
as ﬁltering some trafﬁc (to avoid being captured), changing
the clock of the monitoring station to corrupt the time-
stamps or disable the capture altogether (i.e. if the time is
outside the DWW limits), or by dropping the captured data
sent by the monitoring station. There are some partial so-
lutions to these problems (i.e. chained signatures and hi-
erarchical TSA) that will be described later, so once a LI
capture is performed it is not possible to delete it and deny
that it was performed.
In summary, the proposedmonitoring station allows the
LI system to be more secure, while minimizing the effect on
the internal operations of the NWO. Now that the pro-
cedures to guarantee a certain security level for the moni-
toring station are clear, let us describe the exchange of
information between the NWO and the LEA, once the judge
has signed the DWW.
Lawful Interception of a communication
The NWO uses the information about the suspect inside
the DWWNWO to look for the identiﬁers of that speciﬁc
customer. The IRI Internal Intercept Function (IRI-IIF) and
the CC Trigger Function (CCTF) elements deﬁned by ETSI LI
are employed to decide when and where a legal intercep-
tion should be initiated. For instance the targeted user may
have an xDSL subscription, which may be monitored
continuously by a MS in the local DSLAM. Although the
suspect may also connect to a WiFi hotspot in a different
place, involving a separate monitoring station that must
only capture data when that particular data session is
active. Therefore, it is not possible to add any furthertechnical information (like the user's IP address or a static
MS identiﬁer) to the DWW in order to further restrict what
data should be captured, because such technical data may
be highly dynamic (i.e. a dynamic IP address or a mobile
user connecting to different hotspots). Instead, the appro-
priate CC Internal Intercept Function (CC-IIF)/Monitoring
Station (MS) can be selected dynamically, and it should
receive the technical information to perform the capture
(i.e. the IP address assigned by the DHCP server to the user)
from the CCTF, together with the DWWNWO that authorizes
such interception. All data captured by the MS is sent to the
mediation function (MF), which merely acts as a proxy. The
investigation case identiﬁer (ICid) of the DWWNWO warrant
allows the MF to send the intercepted information to the
appropriate LEA (LEMFaddr). In general, a MS that receives a
DWWNWO performs the following steps:
1. It ﬁrst checks the signature of the DWWNWO by means of
the judge's public certiﬁcate (Jpub). The MS checks that
this certiﬁcate is valid using the public root certiﬁcate of
the judicial system (pre-installed in all MSs HSMs).
2. The HSM of the MS generates a new random session key
(K) that is employed by a symmetric cipher to encrypt all
captured information during a speciﬁc pre-conﬁgured
amount of time (e.g. the whole data session, one hour,
etc.). This key is then encrypted with the public key of
the case: encICpub(K). If we assume that the certiﬁcation
process is reliable, and thus that the monitoring station
is a trusted device that cannot be externallymanipulated
to obtain K or affect its generation, only the ones with
the private key of the case (ICpriv) are able to obtain K,
and thus to access the captured data in clear text. The
usage of a symmetric key protected with the asymmetric
key of the investigated case has additional beneﬁts due
to the higher performance of symmetric ciphers. For
instance, if a suspect is being monitored by two LEAs,
which should not be aware of each other due to security
reasons, the monitoring station can just encrypt and
send the captured data once to theMF, and then it is only
necessary to encrypt the symmetric key twice, using the
ICpub keys of each LEA case.
3. The intercepted contents of communication (CC) data, as
deﬁned by the CCtype ﬁeld in the DWWNWO, are signed
and time-stamped to enable a proper chain of custody.
The signature is performed using the private key of the
monitoring station (MSpriv), which is securely stored at
its HSM, whereas the timestamp comes from a local
time-stamping authority (TSANWO) that must send these
timestamps to the TSAglobal periodically, in order to avoid
MSs connecting directly to the TSAglobal. Direct MS-TSA-
global connections may require excessive changes in the
NWO infrastructure or be non-compliant with NWO
corporate policy or national legislation. To limit
desynchronization and other attacks (e.g. information
deletion, forgery of NWO clock, etc.) a number of pre-
cautions in the interactions between TSANWO and TSA-
global are considered. It is important to remember that
each monitoring station relies on current time for
several operations, such as deciding whether a certiﬁ-
cate is still valid, when to start/stop a LI capture as9
Table 1
Hash-chain of consecutive packets.
CC1 ¼ encK ðpacket1Þ CC1Hash ¼ hashðCC1Þ
CCHashChain ¼ CC1Hash;
CC2 ¼ encK ðpacket2Þ CC2Hash ¼ hashðCC2Þ
CCHashChain ¼ hashðCCHashChainjCC2HashÞ;
CCn ¼ encK ðpacketnÞ CCnHash ¼ hashðCCnÞ
CCHashChain ¼ hashðCCHashChainjCCnHashÞ;deﬁned in the DWW, and specially in order to timestamp
the captured data, which may be essential evidence in
some trials (e.g. the suspect knew certain information
before the crime was made public).
The local TSANWO should be also certiﬁed and audited by
JS technicians, and any unauthorised modiﬁcation should
lead to a criminal investigation. However, since it provides
dynamic information, let us assume that it may be
temporarily subverted by the NWO but then restored
before the next JS audit. In order to prevent this, it should
send every T seconds a summary of all received time-
stamping requests during that period to the TSAglobal,
which is no longer under control of the NWO, that time-
stamps and logs them:
SendMSTSANWOHashCCdata1 ¼hashðCCdata1Þ
SendTSANWOMSTSANWOCCdata1 ¼
n
DateNWO;tstampTSANWOpriv
DateNWO;hash

CCdata1
o
SendTSANWOTSAglobal TSANWOCCs¼
n
tstampTSANWOpriv
ðDateNWO;hashðCCdata1ÞÞ;tstampTSANWOpriv
Date0NWO;hash

CCdata2

;…
o
After obtaining a timestamp from the TSANWO, the MS
can send the captured information to the MF. We consider
two possible modes of operation: Block Mode and Packet
Mode.
In Block Mode (BM) the captured information is not sent
to the LEA until some size or time threshold (e.g. 10 MB or
1 h) is reached:
CapturedBlock¼encKðCCÞ
AnonymousMSid¼encJStech ðfnonce;encnonceðMSidÞgÞ
BlockMetaInfo¼
n
encICpub ðKÞ;Blockid;Blockcounter;ICid;
AnonymousMSid;hashðCapturedBlockÞ
o
SignMSBlockMetaInfo¼signMSprivðBlockMetaInfoÞ
TSANWOBlockMetaInfo¼ tstampTSANWOpriv
ðDateNWO;SignMSBlockMetaInfoÞ
SendCapturedBlockMSLEA ¼
fCapturedBlock; BlockMetaInfo; SignMSBlockMetaInfo;
DateNWO; TSANWOBlockMetaInfog
In Packet Mode (PM) each packet is sent in real time to
the LEA:
SendCapturedPacketMS ¼ fencKðCCÞ;Blockidg
However, in order to protect packet integrity in
Packet Mode, every packetsnum packets a new “virtual
block” (VBlock) starts, generating a new key for the next
“virtual block” and signing the previous one with its
hash chain:VBlockMetaInfo¼
n
encICpub ðKÞ;Blockid;Blockcounter ;ICid;
AnonymousMSid;CCHashChain
o
SignMSV BlockMetaInfo¼signMSpriv ðVBlockMetaInfoÞ
TSANWOVBlockMetaInfo¼tstampTSANWOpriv
ðDateNWO;SignMSV BlockMetaInfoÞ
SendVBlockMS¼fVBlockMetaInfo;SignMSV BlockMetaInfo;
DateNWO;TSANWOVBlockMetaInfog
The meaning of the previous parameters is as follows:
encK(CC): Captured Content of Communication (CC), either 
a single packet (in PM) or a whole block (in BM), encrypted 
with symmetric session key K.
Blockid: It numerates the block or speciﬁes that the packet 
belongs to a speciﬁc block. Its initial value is random and it 
is increased by every new block generated by the MS, 
independently from the active investigation cases or LEAs. 
This prevents a LEA knowing if other LEAs are investigating 
the same suspect at the same time. A MS can send blocks or 
packets from different interceptions associated to different 
LEAs using the same Blockid.
Blockcounter: Block counter per interception of each LEA in 
this MS. It is incremented by 1 each new block. It allows the 
LEA detecting missing blocks.
AnonymousMSid: In order to hide the NWO's topology, the 
MS identiﬁer could be hidden from LEAs, but be still 
accessible by the judicial systems auditors. The MSid can be 
encrypted with a random number (nonce) generated for 
every block that acts as the key. This encryption prevents a 
LEA knowing if two different blocks come from the same 
monitoring station. Only the judicial authority is able to 
know the real MS identiﬁer (MSid), when it wants to vali-
date some evidence (with the private key of JStech). 
CCHashChain: This allows securely chaining the packets, to 
send only one digital signature every packetsnum packets in 
order to protect them all. It also allows identifying dropped 
or corrupted packets, because, unless all packets are 
received correctly, the combined signature will not match 
(Table 1).
In each operation mode there are general CC informa-
tion and meta-information. Only Meta-information is
associated with a speciﬁc LEA. This allows the same CC to
be delivered to different LEAs without knowing that there
are other involved LEAs. The MS sends all this information
to theMFwhich separates and delivers it to the appropriate
LEA using the ICid.10
Finally, it is worth noting that although the above
description has been focused on the captured Content of
Communication (CC), because it is the one with more
stringent performance requirements, the same mecha-
nisms can be employed to protect Intercept Related Infor-
mation (IRI) by applying the proposed changes to the MS to
the IRI IIF function that handles communication metadata.
Furthermore, the two modes of operation allow this DWW
proposal to be employed with other technologies consid-
ered by ETSI LI beyond IP-based communications. For
instance Packet Mode can be also applicable to layer 2 data
communications (e.g. Ethernet VPNs), whereas Block Mode
is more appropriate for application-layer services that ex-
change complete messages like e-mail.
For additional security, the communication channel
between the NWO (MF) and the LEA (LEMFaddr) should be
also based on IPSec or TLS, which may be employed to
convey both, the CC and the IRI from a single case, or even
from multiple cases, since each case is uniquely identiﬁed
(ICid).
Once the information has arrived to a LEA, it also asks 
for a secure timestamp in order to acknowledge the 
reception of such information. As in the NWO case, the LEA 
may deploy its own Time Stamping Authority (TSALEA), and 
just send all locally-signed records to the global TSA (TSA-
global) periodically (as described for the TSANWO). At the end 
of this process, the LEA stores in a database, for further 
analysis, the information shown in Table 2. For simplicity, it 
only shows /tone CC block, from a single MS.
Since seized information may be later employed as
digital evidence, all captured data should also be archived
into some secure, off-line, long-term storage, like backup
tapes, abiding all appropriate data retention laws. Notice
that, since all captured data is still in an encrypted form, it
can (and should) be handled by a LEA department different
to the one performing the investigation. For instance,
backup tapes may be stored by the LI administration
department of the LEA and/or the judicial system one. The
LEA can only process the intercepted data when the judge
sends it the DWWLEA warrant:
SignJSJDWWLEA ¼ signJSpriv

SignJDWWLEA

SendJSLEADWWLEA ¼ encLEApub

DWWLEA; SignJDWWLEA;
SignJSJDWWLEA

The administrative department of the LEA receives the
DWWLEA from the judge. It contains the private key of theTable 2
Information about captured data (one block) stored by the LEA.
Content of Communication (CC):
CapturedBlock encK ðCCÞ
CC Meta Information:
BlockMetaInfo fencICpub ðKÞ;Blo
SignMSBlockMetaInfo signMSpriv ðBlockM
DateNWO When the MS c
TSANWOBlockMetaInfo tstampTSANWOpriv ð
TSALEA:
DateLEA When LEA rece
TSALEABlockMetaInfo tstampTSALEApriv ðDcase (ICpriv) that should be distributed internally only to the
team of agents investigating that particular case. Since
anyone with access to the key may access the captured
information, the LEA should also employ secure mecha-
nisms to convey this information locally in an encrypted
form (i.e. using the public keys of the agents).
DWW threat model
The Digital Wiretap Warrant (DWW) proposal guaran-
tees conﬁdentiality, integrity, timeliness and authenticity
of the exchanged information end-to-end, by means of
public key cryptography and digital signatures (i.e. PKI and
TSA). The Monitoring Station (MS) is able to check whether
the DWW is valid (i.e. signed by an authorized judge)
before it starts capturing any data. Also a forensic expert
can certify the source MS of any evidence during a trial.
Additionally, the DWW framework deﬁnes a key distribu-
tion protocol for the symmetric keys employed to encrypt
the captured information (i.e. encICpub(K)), which are also
protected end-to-end. Thus, the Network Operator (NWO)
cannot peek into the captured data, even when it traverses
its Mediation Function (MF) proxy, but only the Law
Enforcement Agency (LEA) agents that know the private
key of the case (ICpriv). Secure logging and timestamping
enables auditing by registering who did what and when all
operations were performed. Moreover, the extensive usage
of digital signatures provides non-repudiation properties to
most inter-organization operations.
Therefore, the DWW proposal deﬁnes security mech-
anisms against all general security attacks speciﬁed by
ETSI, including denial of service and sabotage, as analysed
later. Furthermore, the DWW proposal also considers
advanced attacks that are speciﬁc to LI platforms, such as
evidence fabrication or tampering, even in confabulation
scenarios.Evidence fabrication, tampering and deletion
The DWW proposal has been designed so that it is very
hard to fabricate or tamper evidence once it has been
delivered to the LEA (i.e. the NWO may be able to delay or
delete data while on transit by controlling the MS com-
munications, although those attempts may still be detec-
ted by auditing the MS/TSA logs). Once registered by the
LEA, they are protected even if the NWO and the LEA
confabulate, unless the Judicial System and the globalckid;Blockcounter ; ICid;AnonymousMSid;hashðCapturedBlockÞg
etaInfoÞ
aptured the CC
DateNWO; SignMSBlockMetaInfoÞ
ived the captured CC
ateLEA; SignMSBlockMetaInfoÞ
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time-stamping authority (TSAglobal) also cooperate with
them.
Evidence fabrication or tampering: All seized data is
digitally signed by the monitoring station that captured
it. Therefore, unless the monitoring station is compro-
mised (e.g. the MSpriv key is extracted from the HSM),
such information cannot be modiﬁed later on. Even if the
NWO is able to feed the MS with any trafﬁc it wants, the
information must be time-stamped by the TSANWO and
TSAglobal (and thus logged). Therefore, it is not possible to
change the evidence date to the past, and in any case the
attack can only be performed before the DWW time limit
is over.
Deleting evidence: Even though all elements of the LI
platform should be accessed by authorized personnel only,
somebody (by being blackmailed or bribed) may try to
sabotage/delete some key evidence, as well as the local logs
of the system to hide his steps. Therefore, some trusted
third party is necessary to log what information was
exchanged and when. In particular, the time-stamping
authorities (TSAs) securely log all information (i.e. its
hash) that has been time-stamped. Therefore, by auditing
TSAglobal logs, it would be possible to know the last system
(e.g. the MF or LEMF) that received certain missing infor-
mation, and therefore corner the perpetrator.
Therefore, TSAs are also key elements of the DWW 
proposal and thus, they should be certiﬁed and the LI in-
formation shown in Table 3 should be securely logged and 
backed up.
Once the captured data arrives to the LEA and it is
backed-up in different places, deleting all copies of some
evidence would be quite challenging. Therefore, the most
vulnerable time is when the captured data is in transit. For
instance, some NWO operator may try to drop some of the
captured data (because dropping it all could be easily
detected by the LEA). But even in that case the NWO or LEA
may notice that some block or set of packets is missing
because blocks are sent periodically (even if empty) or due
to the proposed hash chaining mechanism explained
previously.Denial of service attacks and off-line communications
Like the ETSI LI architecture, the DWW proposal clearly
identiﬁes the interfaces between elements of the LI system.
In particular there are a limited number of points where
inter-organization communications take place, and in most
cases they involve proxies that hide internal elements. For
instance, monitoring stations do never communicate with
other elements outside the NWO network. Captured data is
sent to the LEA through the MF proxy, and timestamps areTable 3
Information stored by the global Time Stamping Authority (TSAglobal).
Name of TSAglobal record
TSAglobalSignLEADWWrqst
TSAglobalSignJSJDWWNWO
TSAglobalSignLEAJDWWNWO
List of TSANWOBlockMetaInfo
List of TSALEABlockMetaInfoobtained from the local TSANWO. Therefore, it should be
more difﬁcult to target internal elements by external at-
tackers, because only the intermediate systems are acces-
sible, which are fewer and thus easier to protect. Moreover,
even if public networks like Internet are employed for
inter-organization communication, the topology is fairly
static in the sense that there are a small number of orga-
nizations (i.e. a single national Judicial System, few LEAs
and several NWOs) that have long-term relationships.
Therefore, it is reasonable to build a Virtual Private
Network (VPN) with mutual authentication, like IPSec,
between NWOs and LEAs, as well as between the TSAglobal
and TSANWO/TSALEA, and ﬁlter the trafﬁc from any other
source. However, if the attacker knows the public IP
address of the NWO or LEA mediation function, it still can
try to ﬂood its upstream link or network, albeit such kind
active attack will be easily detected and acted upon.
Finally, an additional beneﬁt of the end-to-end encryp-
tion and explicit time-stamping of the DWWproposal is that
inter-organization communications may be easily per-
formed off-line, whereas the current ETSI speciﬁcation
implicitly assumes that captured trafﬁc is sent to the LEA in
real time (and thus the capture time is roughly the same as
when received by the LEA). On the contrary, in a DWW-
enabled LI system captured trafﬁc can be securely stored
by any intermediate element until communications are
restored, since it is encrypted and time-stamped at capture
time. Therefore, a sustained DoS attack may delay when
LEAs receive captured data, but it will eventually arrive (e.g.
in a hard disk delivered in a courier van). The only subsystem
that requires some real-time performance is the TSA hier-
archy, and thus TSAglobal is an important element that should
be protected accordingly. Moreover, if TSANWOs and TSALEAs
are properly certiﬁed, they can even work independently of
TSAglobal during limited periods of time.Technical limitations of the DWW framework
Currently, ETSI LI standards are based on the adminis-
trative trust among domains, and especially on the NWO
side. The DWW platform ﬁxes the problems derived from
trusting in domains that could be corruptible or subverted.
Only the new features introduced into each monitoring
station could be considered truly intrusive, but they are
necessary for enhancing the aimed security, privacy and
civil rights guarantees. Although it tries to minimize the
trust in the NWO, there are some problems that do not have
practical technical solutions, without severely interfering
with the NWO infrastructure. For instance, a NWO can
inject trafﬁc, modify or eliminate it before reaching the
monitoring station, so even a fully trusted MS HSM cannotContent of TSAglobal record (þDateglobal)
tstampTSAglobalpriv ðDateglobal; SignLEADWWrqstÞ
tstampTSAglobalpriv ðDateglobal; SignJSJDWWNWOÞ
tstampTSAglobalpriv ðDateglobal; SignLEAJDWWNWOÞ
tstampTSANWOpriv ðDateglobal; SignMSBlockMetaInfoÞ
tstampTSALEApriv ðDateglobal ; SignMSBlockMetaInfoÞ
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identify or solve this situation (nor current WW-based LI
platforms). However, these measures seem quite sophisti-
cated compared to just telling the suspect that is been
monitored so he does not send any incriminating trafﬁc.
Therefore, LI operations (either WW- or DWW-based ones)
must be always handled by a small set of trusted NWO
personnel.
Due to the dynamic nature of monitoring, a NWO could
modify the CCTF and/or MF functions to try to target a
different user with a valid DWW issued for another suspect.
However, since the MS encrypts all captured trafﬁc, the
NWO won't be able to access this information, unless it isTable 4
Size of TSAglobal logs per investigation case.
Size of each TSAglobal log entry:
Date (64 bits timestamp) 8
Digital signature (Padded RSA 2048) 25
Size of 3 log entries for administrative exchanges
(LEA-JS, JS-LEA, LEA-NWO)
3
Size of logs for timestamped data
(TSANWO  TSAglobal and TSALEA  TSAglobal)
2
Nu
CC
N:
Total size of TSAglobal logs ð3
Table 5
Size of LEA database per investigation case using Block Mode.
Block Mode Database
CapturedBlock encK ðCCÞ
BlockMetaInfo encICpub ðKÞ
Blockid
Blockcounter
ICid
Blockid
encJStech ðfnonce;
encnonceðMSidÞg
hashðCapturedBlockÞ
SignMSBlockMetaInfo signMSpriv ðBlockMetaIn
DateNWO
TSANWOBlockMetaInfo tstampTSANWOpriv ðDateN
Total size per block of N bytes
Total size per investigated case
Security overhead
Table 6
Size of LEA database per investigation case using Packet Mode.
Packet Mode Database
SendCapturedPacketMS encK ðCCÞ
(CC: single packet) Blockid
N ¼ packetsnumpacketsize packetsize ¼ M
V BlockMetaInfo encICpub ðKÞ
Blockid
Blockcounter
ICid
encJStech ðfnonce; encnon
CCHashChain
SignMSV BlockMetaInfo signMSpriv ðV BlockMeta
date
TSANWOVBlockMetaInfo tstampTSANWOpriv ðDate; S
Total V Block size of packetsnum packets of M bytes on average
Total size per investigated case
Security overheadable to compromise the security of the certiﬁed MS HSM.
Therefore, although a NWO can still deploy additional
equipment to spy its customers, it can no longer abuse the
DWW-enabled, mandatory LI infrastructure for any illegal
purposes.Evaluation of the DWW framework
This? section? ﬁrst? analyses? the? dimensioning? of? the?
DWW?databases? that? store?all? seized?data?and? the? logs?of?
each? investigation? case.? Tables? 4e6? show? the? analytical?
expressions? to? calculate? the? total? size? of? the? LEA? andbytes
6 bytes
ð8þ 256Þ bytes
ðNumBlocksÞð8þ 256Þ bytes
mBlocks ¼ CCSize=N bytes
Size: Total size of captured data
Size of each Block (Block Mode) or VBlock of packetsnum (Packet Mode)
þ 2NumBlocksÞð8þ 256Þ bytes ¼ 792þ 528NumBlocks bytes
N bytes
256 bytes
8 bytes
8 bytes
16 bytes
8 bytes
256 bytes
32 bytes
foÞ 256 bytes
8 bytes
WO; SignMSBlockMetaInfoÞ 256 bytes
N þ 1096 bytes
NumBlocksðN þ 1096Þ bytes
NumBlocks1096 bytes
M bytes
8 bytes
N þ 8packetsnum
256 bytes
8 bytes
8 bytes
16 bytes
ceðMSidÞg 256 bytes
32 bytes
InfoÞ 256 bytes
8 bytes
ignMSV BlockMetaInfoÞ 256 bytes
N þ 8packetsnum þ 1096 bytes
NumBlocksðN þ 8packetsnum þ 1096Þ bytes
NumBlocksð8packetsnum þ 1096Þ bytes
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Fig. 3. Performance of block and packet encryption for different block sizes.TSAglobal logs per investigation case. In our calculations, we 
suppose AES-256 for symmetric encryption, SHA-256 for 
hashing and RSA-2048 for signing. With these expressions, 
Table 7 provides some storage size and overhead values for 
an example scenario.
Finally, Table 8 shows the cryptographic operations 
executed by the MS to protect the captured data in a DWW-
enabled LI platform. The sustained throughput of the MS is 
limited by the performance of the symmetric encryption of 
captured data and the size of the blocks to be signed, which 
deﬁne the number of asymmetric operations.
In order to validate the feasibility of the proposed se-
curity mechanisms, Fig. 3 shows the performance of the 
whole data protection process, both in Block and Packet 
Modes, implemented in Java with its standard Crypto-
graphic API, and executed in an off-the-shelf sever 
featuring two Intel Xeon E5420 processors (with
4  2.50 GHz cores) and 8 GB of RAM. The throughput has
been computed by measuring the time to encrypt and sign
blocks of the speciﬁed sizes (or 512 bytes-long packets and
their associated VBlocks) 100 times and then computing
the average block processing time and resulting
throughput. Each experiment has been repeated 5 times
with different data in order to obtain a 95% conﬁdence
interval.Table 7
Approximate overhead to capture 8 GiB (¼8*230 bytes) from a suspect.
Parameters
CCSize
packetsize
N
NumBlocks ¼ CCSize=N
Database size Block Mode
TSAgobal 792þ 528NumBlocks ¼ 433 752 ¼ 423 KiB
LEA NumBlocks*(Nþ1096) ¼ CCSizeþ NumBlocks 1096 ¼ CCSize þ
LEA overhead 0.01045%
Table 8
Cryptographic operations of Monitoring Station for protecting the captured data
Block Mode Crypt
encK ðCCÞ/t ¼ ðN=256 bits) t sym
encICpub ðKÞ 1 asy
encJStech ðfnonce; encnonceðMSidÞgÞ 1 sym
hashðCapturedBlockÞ 1 has
SignMSprivBlockMetaInfo 1 has
Total operations per Block: (t þ 1
Packet Mode Crypt
Per packet:
encK ðCCÞ/p ¼ packetsize=256 bits p sym
CCHashChain 1 has
Per Virtual Block of packetsnum:
encICpub ðKÞ 1 asy
encJStech ðfnonce; encnonceðMSidÞgÞ 1 sym
CCHashChain 1 has
SignMSprivVBlockMetaInfo 1 has
Total operations per VBlock: packe
þ 1 sClearly, the size of the block has a signiﬁcant impact on
the performance of the monitoring station, because of the
asymmetric operations that have to be performed to sign
each block. But even with this proof-of-concept, non-
optimized software implementation, a monitor station
using 10 MiB blocks should be able to encrypt data at
240 Mbps or 231 Mbps, in Block and Packet Modes8 GiB
512 bytes (on average)
10 MiB (Block Mode) or
20 480 packets * packetsize
820 blocks
Packet Mode
792þ 528NumBlocks ¼ 433 752 ¼ 423 KiB
877 KiB NumBlocks*(N þ 8packetsnum þ 1096Þ ¼ CCSize þ 129 MiB
1.5747%
.
ographic operations
metric encryptions
mmetric encryption
metric encryption þ 1 asymmetric encryption
h
h þ 1 asymmetric encryption
) symmetric encryptions þ 3 asymmetric encryptions þ 2 hashes
ographic operations
metric encryptions
h
mmetric encryption
metric encryption þ 1 asymmetric encryption
h
h þ 1 asymmetric encryption
tsnumðp symmetric encryptions þ 1 hash) þ 3 asymmetric encryptions
ymmetric encryption þ 1 hash
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respectively. The lower performance of Packet Mode is 
due to the additional hash operations performed for the 
hash chaining of packets. Moreover, by executing seven 
Java processes in parallel in our test server (leaving the 8th 
core for other processes), a sustained throughput of 
1.65 Gbps in block mode (i.e. 236 Mbps per core) has been 
achieved. Furthermore, these results should be considered 
just a lower performance bound. Optimized software 
implementations in microprocessors with AES-NI in-
structions support cipher/decipher speeds in the order of 
4 G B / s ( 3 2 G b i t / s ) ( TrueCrypte hardware 
acceleration, 2014).
The minimum block size to be employed is limited by 
the number of asymmetric operations performed by the 
Hardware Security Module (HSM). Recent studies show 
that at least hundreds of asymmetric operations per second 
for RSA-2048 are feasible. For instance, the Thales nShield 
Solo PCIe 6000 (Thales nShield Solo hardware security 
module, 2015) is able to execute 3000 asymmetric opera-
tions per second. As the monitoring station performs 3 
asymmetric operations per block or every packetsnum 
packets, then it is able to process 1000 blocks per second 
(or 1000*packetsnum). Thus, a 10 Gbps link requires blocks 
of 10Mbits (1.25 MB or higher) or 2441 packets of 512 bytes 
in average. Therefore, we consider that our proposal is able 
to work in high-speed links employing commercial, off-
the-shelf HSM devices.
The major cost of deploying the proposed LI solution
would be adding HSMs to existing monitoring stations and
the (optional) certiﬁcation and auditing process of such
DWW-enabled monitoring stations. Since the same pro-
cedures and elements of the ETSI LI architecture are
maintained, the impact of deploying the rest of the DWW
framework should be quite limited. In particular our pro-
posal only requires deploying additional tools and services
to be employed by current LI personnel in the NWO, LEA
and judicial system. Therefore, apart from the training in
the new tools, the remaining costs may come from the new
standard security services like public key infrastructures
(PKIs) and time stamping authorities (TSAs). However, we
do consider that most organizations might have already
deployed such PKI and TSA services, since they are useful
for many other purposes beyond secure lawful
interception.
Conclusions and future work
This paper proposes the so-called Digital Wiretap
Warrant (DWW) to enhance the security and privacy of
Lawful Interception (LI) speciﬁcations employed nowadays,
while maintaining all existing procedures and human su-
pervision. In particular, the DWW proposal is fully
compatible with current ETSI LI requirements and speciﬁ-
cations, albeit it expands them in a number of ways.
First of all, by turning paper-based wiretap warrants
into digital documents, it is now possible that all elements
of the LI infrastructure verify, by means of cryptographic
signatures, whether a given capture session has been
approved by an authorized judge. Moreover, a DWW-
enabled monitoring station signs and encrypts all
captured data end-to-end, so only the law enforcementagency that requested the DWW is able to decrypt it; as
opposed to the current practice of encrypting the captured
data hop-by-hop, where any intermediate node of the
network operator is able to alter or peek into such data.
The DWW proposal also improves the chain of custody
of digital evidence by securely signing and time-stamping
all captured data. This is enabled by certiﬁed monitoring
stations with hardware security modules, and a hierarchy
of timestamp authorities, which guarantee that seized ev-
idence has not been fabricated, tampered or silently
deleted, even in confabulation scenarios.
Moreover, since the global Time Stamping Authority
(TSA) is a third party that oversights all messages
exchanged by the LI platform, including the data plane
ones, it may be also employed for improved LI auditing.
Nowadays Lawful Interception is subject to public scrutiny
by requiring the Judicial System to publish periodically the
number of wiretap requests by how many agencies,
affecting how many suspects, etc. Currently this informa-
tion is collected at administrative level. Our proposal
maintains the current administrative auditing practices,
but it enables advanced auditing by collecting also tech-
nical data such as the number of active warrants, their
durations, the number of captured data blocks, etc. This
technical data can be then correlated with the statistics
gathered at the administrative level to check any kind of
mismatch that may require further probing. This enhanced
auditing process will be studied in future works.
The deployment costs and scalability of the proposed
DWW framework and its encryption mechanisms have
been evaluated qualitatively, but also quantitatively using a
proof-of-concept software encryption implementation. It
has been concluded that the proposed DWW-enabled
monitoring stations can achieve a reasonable perfor-
mance with commercial off-the-shelf devices, since the
data path is based on a symmetric cipher, whereas public
key cryptography is only employed for secure key distri-
bution, even when several LEAs are monitoring the same
suspect.
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